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Practice-Driven Changes to Constitutional
Structures of Governance
James A. Gardner-
Among the methods of informal constitutional change,
perhaps the least studied or understood is change resulting
from alterations in the way governance is practiced. Such
change, typically initiated by political actors in the executive
and legislative branches, is probably the most common kind of
constitutional change, and is almost certainly the most
common source of informal change to structural provisions. In
the United States, the best known instances of practice-driven
changes to constitutional structure come from the federal
level-the rise of a formal party system, for example, or the
dramatic twentieth-century expansion of presidential power.
Yet by far the most copious and dramatic examples of such
change in the United States are to be found at the subnational
level, in changes wrought by practice to the structural
provisions of state constitutions. New York's system of
legislation by "three men in a room," for example, or its
replacement of competitive judicial elections with a
democratically meaningless system of party cross-
endorsement deals, bear no resemblance to either the
provisions of the written state constitution regulating
practices of governance, or to the conceptions of governance
on which those provisions were founded. The sheer range of
practice-driven deviation from constitutional schema in turn
raises important questions about the ability of constitutions to
stabilize official behavior at structural design points.
* Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor and Interim Dean, SUNY
Buffalo Law School, The State University of New York. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at a symposium on State Constitutional Change: Traditions, Trends,
and Theory, held at the University of Arkansas School of Law in Fayetteville, Arkansas,
on January 22, 2016. 1 thank the organizers, and especially Professor Jonathan
Marshfield, for their kind hospitality; and the participants for an illuminating day of
conversation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Constitutions perform two great functions. First and
foremost, they create the state'-they establish institutions,
assign powers,2 and in general "define the structure of the
'normally' functioning state,"3 all for the purpose of creating
a government capable of achieving the polity's most
important, long-term, collective goals. That, in a sense, is the
easy part, for the second great function of a constitution is,
having created a state and identified its goals,4 to control its
behavior. As Madison remarked, "In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself."5 The prime challenge of constitutional design,
then, is to create a set of institutions and rules that will
"control the state" and, in appropriate and desirable ways,
"influence how the government acts."6
Implicit in this account of constitutions is the
proposition that design matters-that constitutions do in
fact guide, shape, and, at the end of the day, control the
practices of governments. Design, on this view, has
1. EDWARD SCHNEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 2-3 (2006); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the
Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 411-12 (2007); Jeremy Waldron, Constitutionalism: A
Skeptical View, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 267, 273-74
(Thomas Christiano & John Christman eds., 2009).
2. Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and
Political Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 3, 6 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013); Keith E. Whittington,
The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1847, 1855 (2013); Jeff King, Constitutions as Mission Statements, in SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 73, 81; Young, supra note 1.
3. Peter C. Ordeshook, Some Rules of Constitutional Design, in LIBERALISM AND THE
ECONOMIC ORDER 198, 205 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993).
4. King, supra note 2.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
6. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to
Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 37, 40 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); see also GIOVANNI SARTORI,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND
OUTCOMES 198 (1994) ("[C]onstitutions are, first and above all, instruments of
government which limit, restrain and allow for the control of the exercise of political
power....").
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consequences.7 To live under a constitution that is designed
means to live under a government that is bound by a
constitutional plan. A commitment to this belief is, after all,
the only explanation for why we bother to design a
constitution in the first place, and to do so as deliberately,
thoughtfully, and carefully as possible.8  Indeed, the
commitment to the belief that design matters furnishes the
only possible basis for the practice, dating back at least to
Aristotle, of normatively evaluating and critiquing
constitutions and their features.9
Yet it has long been understood that constitutional
design alone is, or at least may be, insufficient to place
permanent, effective constraints on the exercise of state
power. Some constitutional actors may not consider
themselves bound by constitutional instructions. Others
may view constitutional directives to require behavior that
is outmoded, ineffective, or ill-suited to the successful
pursuit of public goals. Still others may not deem it in their
own private interest to observe constitutional limitations.
Madison himself understood this problem well,
acknowledging that constraints on power, no matter how
specifically articulated or deeply entrenched in the
constitutional text, might function as little more than
"parchment barriers"10 with a weak capacity to constrain
uncooperative power holders.
If we can expect government officials from time to time
to stretch, flout, or evade constitutional rules, then a difficult
complication arises: the problem of informal constitutional
change. Although there was of course no way the American
founders could have known it, subsequent experience has
shown that constitutions change over time, even without
7. Denis J. Galligan, The People, the Constitution, and the Idea of Representation,
in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 134, 135; Tom
Ginsburg, Introduction, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 10 (Tom Ginsburg
ed., 2012); Philip Pettit, Institutional Design and Rational Choice, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 54, 55-57 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996); KATHLEEN THELEN, How
INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED
STATES, AND JAPAN 31 (2004); ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 211
(2000).
8. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 4.
9. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, ch. VII.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
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formal amendment. No government created by a
constitution that has endured for any length of time goes
about its business in the same way it did at its inception.
Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that changes in official
practice can in the right circumstances alter the constitution
itself." Although government actors most often dutifully
exercise powers defined by the constitution, that is not
always the case. Sometimes, invoking what Stephen Griffin
calls "the latent power contained within roles created by the
text,"12 officials redefine their own authority, in effect
changing the substance of the very constitutional rules to
which they ought in principle to be subject. In the United
States, widely cited examples of such "informal amendment"
through "practice,"'3 or through "usage," "custom," or
"convention,"14 include the rise of a formal party system;15
the dramatic twentieth-century expansion of presidential
power;16 the complete inversion of the Electoral College
from an independent body of elites to a ministerial
transmitter of mass political sentiment;'7 and the
transformation of the Senate "from an institution that
resembled, in many respects, the English House of Lords, to
an institution that functioned quite similarly to the House of
11. This contention has probably been put as strongly by Karl Llewellyn as by
anyone: "Wherever there are today established practices 'under' or 'in accordance
with' the [Constitution], it is only the practice which can legitimize the words as being
still part of our going Constitution. It is not the words which legitimize the practice."
K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1934). The
power of practice to alter constitutions is well described in, for example, KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING (1999), and STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at ix, 10 (1982).
12. Stephen M. Griffin, The United States of America, in How CONSTITUTIONS
CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 357, 373 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
13. Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62
AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 643 (2014); WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:
CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 333 (2007).
14. K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 223 (4th ed. 1964); Brandon P. Denning,
Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 198 (1997).
15. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on
Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 621
(2014).
16. Griffin, supra note 12, at 371; Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or
Desuetude: The Case ofArticle V, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1065 (2014).
17. See Denning, supra note 14, at 212-14; Whittington, supra note 2, at 1857.
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Representatives."18  On this view, not only does
constitutional design enjoy limited capacity to control the
behavior and practices of government officials, but even
worse, the polarity of authority can at times reverse, so that
innovations in official practice by constitutional actors can
produce and entrench modifications to the original
constitutional design.
Part II of this paper lays out a few salient basics of
constitutional design. Part III discusses the limits of
constitutional design, introducing the phenomenon of
informal constitutional change. Part IV examines the
phenomenon of informal constitutional change caused by
changes in the practices of government officials. It does so
by focusing on practice-driven change to the constitution of
New York State, where such changes have been dramatic in
scope and highly subversive of accountable democratic self-
governance. Part V turns to some concluding-and
skeptical-reflections about the possible limits of practice-
driven constitutional change.
II. BASICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
To speak of written constitutions is to speak by
definition of design.19  Because such constitutions are
created at a single moment, in a deliberative act intended to
establish an entirely new and complete constitutional
order-a "novus ordo seclorum," a new order for the ageS20 -
their creation presupposes intentional design.
The process of intentional constitutional design
necessarily begins with the identification of goals-"to form
a more perfect Union,"21 "to promote world peace,"22 "to
18. Graber, supra note 15, at 626.
19. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1-2.
20. This phrase has since 1782 appeared on the reverse of the Great Seal of the
United States. 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 339
(Worthington Chauncey Ford et al. eds., 1904-1937), http://www.constitution.org/
uslaw/cont-cong/22journals-continental-congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UHL-QT
H4]; see also Forrest McDonald, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 262 (1985).
21. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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establish justice, liberty, and security."23  The design
enterprise cannot get off the ground if designers do not
know what they are designing for, nor can a design be
judged except in reference to how well it achieves its own
goals.2 4 Once a set of goals is identified, constitutional
design may proceed to the task of creating the basic
institutions of the state25-typically, in modern states, a
legislature, an executive, a judiciary, perhaps a bureaucracy,
and numerous other possible subsystems.
At this point, a basic choice constitutional designers
must make concerns the allocation of powers and
responsibilities among constitutional actors-which actors
and institutions are authorized to exercise what powers and
functions.26 Resolution of this question requires deciding:
(1) whether a power or function will be exercised at all by
any government official, that is, whether the power will rest
in private or public hands;27 and (2) if allocated to the
government, to which official any particular power will be
assigned. This aspect of constitutional design thus raises
familiar, bread-and-butter issues of constitutional
jurisprudence such as who has the power to regulate
commerce, levy taxes, initiate military conflict, define and
prosecute crimes, enforce human rights, and so forth.
To assign powers, however, is to say little about how
they may be used; power may be exercised in many different
ways, under many different procedures. Accordingly,
another class of decisions facing constitutional designers is
whether to require constitutional actors to adhere to specific
practices when wielding assigned powers, and if so, in what
detail such instructions should be issued. In many cases,
constitutional designers may be indifferent to the details of
how government officials exercise their assigned powers.
Merely assigning powers and providing adequate incentives
for their appropriate use-electoral accountability, for
example, or the possibility of impeachment-may be
23. CONSTITUCliN ESPAOLA, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978, pmbl. (Spain).
24. Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their Design, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 7, at 1, 34-37; Ginsburg, supra note 7.
25. Galligan & Versteeg, supra note 2; Young, supra note 1, at 412.
26. See COOTER, supra note 7, at 2.
27. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X.
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thought sufficient to ensure that officials will use their
powers in ways consistent with the constitution's long-term
goals.
On the other hand, designers might now and again have
reasons to prefer that officials adopt some forms of practice
over others. This might be the case when designers believe
that one ;et of practices will lead more reliably than others
to the fulfillment of constitutional goals. For example, the
U.S. Constitution establishes an elaborate, non-discretionary
procedure for the enactment of legislation: Congress must
enact a bill with the concurrence of both chambers, that bill
must be presented to the President, the President may
choose to sign or return it, and if he returns it, Congress may
reconsider the bill and enact it into binding law upon a two-
thirds vote of each chamber.28 According to the Supreme
Court, the Framers imposed this procedure because they
thought it more likely than other possible procedures to
"check whatever propensity a particular Congress might
have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered
measures."29 They thought, in other words, that the practice
of involving the President in lawmaking by requiring a series
of official assents in a particular order demanding active
relations and power-sharing between the two branches
would be more likely than other practices to produce
legislation advancing the Constitution's commitments to
"establish Justice" and "promote the general Welfare."30
Finally for present purposes, constitutional designers
must attend to the problem of "entrenchment"-the problem
of making a constitution durable. What primarily
distinguishes constitutional regimes from legislative ones is
their aspiration to permanence;31 as the U.S. Constitution
prominently proclaims, "We the People" create the
document so as to deliver its benefits "to ourselves and our
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983);
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417,438-41 (1998).
29. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947-948.
30. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
31. It is sometimes said that a constitution is a "precommitment strategy" that
facilitates long-term adherence to a preconceived plan of living. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 88-89 (2000);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 97 (2001).
2016]1 341
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Posterity."32 Thus, a significant problem of constitutional
design concerns how to construct constitutions that will
last-that will retain their structure and substance in spite
of the periodic "turbulence and contention"33 that may be
expected to excite any polity living under a constitution.
Assuming, of course, that citizens of a society are
predisposed to obey their own constitution, designers have a
number of strategies at their disposal to promote the
entrenchment of constitutional rules and norms. Perhaps
the most prominent and widespread strategy to make
constitutions long-lasting is to make them difficult to
change.34 Accordingly, provisions governing the amendment
of constitutions tend to make formal constitutional change
comparatively difficult, typically by requiring a
supermajority vote of the legislature, often coupled with a
requirement of popular ratification.3 5 Each of these steps
requires demanding efforts of political mobilization, which
typically are not only costly, but also risky in the sense that
success is rarely guaranteed.36
Formal amendment, however, addresses only a small
piece of the entrenchment puzzle. Even in a society in which
most people believe that the constitution deserves
obedience and attempt to live by that belief, not everyone
will share this predisposition, and some of them may end up
holding office37-as Madison put it, "Enlightened statesmen
32. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
34. COOTER, supra note 7, at 2; Justin Blount et al., Does the Process of
Constitution-Making Matter?, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 7, at
31, 42; Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARv. L. REV. 657, 672, 697 (2011); Young, supra note 1, at 412.
35. Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, supra note
6, at 237, 237-40; Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment
Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment
Difficulty 1-2 (Coase-Sandor Inst. For Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 682, 2014).
Sometimes amendment rules can be even more difficult to satisfy; the New York
constitution, for example, requires in addition that proposed constitutional
amendments be enacted by two consecutive sessions of the state legislature. N.Y.
CONST. art. XIX, § 1.
36. See Rosalind Dixon & Richard Holden, Constitutional Amendment Rules: The
Denominator Problem, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 7, at 195,
195.
37. As Brennan observes, social characteristics are not uniformly distributed
among the population. Geoffrey Brennan, Selection and the Currency of Reward, in THE
342
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will not always be at the helm."38 In addition, those who
hold power in a constitutional regime may face special
temptations to bend or undermine constitutional rules
because of the possibility of personal gain.39 And even when
all relevant actors agree that the constitution must be
obeyed, and endeavor to do so, ambiguities of constitutional
meaning may give rise to disagreements about what
compliance actually requires. Consequently, a sustainable
entrenchment of constitutional rules generally is thought to
require some mechanism of enforcement.40
The most obvious enforcement strategy is a regime of
policing in which some actor or institution is charged with
monitoring and enforcing compliance with constitutional
rules by other actors. One possible mechanism of
enforcement is democratic accountability; officials who fail
to adhere to constitutional rules and instructions are voted
out of office.41 Another obvious candidate is a court
authorized to undertake judicial review of official action.42
Although such policing regimes are common, they are not
necessarily highly effective. Most constitutional regimes
employ many actors, each operating to some degree under
constraints imposed by constitutional rules. As a practical
matter, it is impossible effectively to police the compliance of
every action taken by every constitutional actor. This is
especially true when the institution assigned to perform the
policing function is a largely passive one, such as an
electorate or a court, which typically must wait for violations
THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, supra note 7, at 256, 257. Screening devices can help
steer the right kinds of people toward public office, but these cannot possibly enjoy
complete success. Id. at 262-72.
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 33.
39. This is the quintessential problem of corruption, a problem that evidently
much exercised the Framers of the U.S. Constitution. Zephyr Teachout, CORRUPTION IN
AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S SNUFF Box TO CITIZENS UNITED (2014).
40. JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 11-12, 95-131
(2009).
41. This, for example, is the concept Justice Scalia articulates in Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[U]ltimately, there is the
political check that the people will replace those in the political branches... who are
guilty of abuse.").
42. This has especially been the case since Kelsen advanced the idea of a
specialized constitutional court. Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional
Review, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 81, 85 (Keith E. Whittington et
al. eds., 2008).
2016]1 343
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to be brought to its attention before taking enforcement
action. Often, the only observers of non-compliant official
action will be other officials, and those officials may have
little incentive to report non-compliance since they are
participants; this is precisely the difficulty posed by the well-
known problem of agent shirking.43
Ill. THE LIMITS OF DESIGN
A. The Phenomenon of Constitutional Change
The view of constitutional design sketched in the
previous Part holds that design matters. The reason design
matters, on this view, is because constitutions are
entrenched regimes of foundational law that guide and
control the actions of the state and its officials. The
aspiration of constitutional designers to provide a
permanent framework for collective life, alterable only by
subsequent purposeful amendment, is thus treated as
realistic. A well-designed document, according to this
model, can meet the challenge posed by Alexander Hamilton
in the opening sentences of The Federalist: "whether
societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether
they are forever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force."44 A well-designed
constitution, then, arises from a kind of socio-political Big
Bang in which, out of the loose matter of the existing
political universe, a new society both forms itself and
establishes for its own governance a new and lasting legal
order.45
There is, however, another view, one grounded less in
democratic and positive political theory than in empirical
observation. On this view, constitutions are far from
immutable foundations of an unchanging state; on the
contrary, constitutional regimes are changeable, even
43. Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253, 1277 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1990).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
45. This is the essence of the contractarian position. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952); THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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evanescent. Globally, the average lifespan of all
constitutions adopted since 1789 is just nineteen years.46
The authors of a recent, comprehensive study of
constitutional endurance conclude that one of the key
elements of constitutional longevity is a constitution's
"flexibility," meaning its "ability to adjust to changing
circumstances."47  Flexibility-the ability to adapt and
change-thus appears to be essential to constitutional
survival.
Adherents of this view hold not only that constitutions
must change; they hold that constitutions in fact do change,
and frequently. "Constitutional change," according to Daryl
Levinson, "is a constant."48 Dawn Oliver and Carlo Fusaro
write that "[a]ll constitutions change continuously."4 9 Unlike
the enterprise of constitutional design, Walter Murphy
argues, the enterprise of "constitutional maintenance
necessarily involves change.... A constitution that cannot
change cannot endure."50 Political scientists have observed
and documented the phenomenon of "authority migration,"
in which there is "movement of power within a political
system."51 In Karl Llewellyn's account, constitutions are
"institutions," and because "[a]n institution is in first
instance a set of ways of living and doing," it is susceptible to
change when ways of living and doing evolve, as they
inevitably must.5 2  In the language of contemporary
institutional theory, "there is nothing automatic, self-
perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional
arrangements. Rather, a dynamic component is built
in .... "53 Constitutions, on this account, adapt constantly,
46. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 2 (2009).
47. Id. at 8, 81-83.
48. Levinson, supra note 34, at 745.
49. Carlo Fusaro & Dawn Oliver, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Change, in
How CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 12, at 405, 424.
50. MURPHY, supra note 13.
51. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Ken Kollman, Authority Migration: Defining an
Emerging Research Agenda, 37 POL. SCI. & POL. 397, 397 (2004); see also Jenna Bednar,
Authority Migration in Federations: A Framework for Analysis, 37 POL. SCI. & POL. 403,
403 (2004).
52. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 17.
53. James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,
in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER 1, 8 (James
Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010).
2016] 345
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and sometimes imperceptibly, to changes in the
environment54 or to changes in the interests and motivations
of evolving coalitions of political actors.55
Knowing that constitutions change often, or even
continuously, still leaves the question of how such change
actually occurs. One common way to categorize methods of
constitutional change is to distinguish between "formal" and
"informal" change.56 The term "formal" is generally reserved
for changes made to the constitutional document through
the process of amendment in compliance with constitutional
rules.57  Although formal constitutional change through
amendment clearly alters constitutional grounds rules, and
does so through a procedure that is by definition politically
legitimate, formal amendment is not always possible.
Amendment procedures can be demanding, often requiring
assembly of a supermajority consensus in multiple
institutions.58 Moreover, those with settled interests under
54. Gerhard Lehmbruch, Constitution-making in Young and Aging Federal
Systems, in REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 30, 30
(Keith G. Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1985); Lutz, supra note 35, at 242; James D.
Kellas, The Politics of Constitution-making: The Experience of the United Kingdom, in
REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 146, 146 (Keith G.
Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1985).
55. THELEN, supra note 7, at xiii, 8, 32, 291, 292-93; Mahoney & Thelen, supra
note 53, at 4.
56. For present purposes, I will bracket an antecedent question that sometimes
occupies constitutional theorists: what counts as constitutional "change" in the first
place? Some theories, in an attempt to account for the observed fact of informal
change in the rules that control government behavior, define narrowly what counts as
a constitution so they can limit the concept of constitutional change to formal modes
and assign the great mass of informal changes to non-constitutional or sub-
constitutional practices or institutions. Thus, theorists sometimes distinguish
between the "large-C," or formal constitution, and the "small-c," or informal
constitution of everyday practice. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
116, 119-20 (2010); Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitutional Change, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 2121, 2155 (1996); Levinson, supra note 34, at 700. My own view is that this
distinction tends toward the arbitrary and formalistic, and is invoked primarily as a
consequence of an antecedent heoretical commitment o the idea that a constitution
is a unique and especially powerful form of positive law that implements the
expressed will of the popular sovereign. There is much to recommend this conception
as an ideal, but it does not comport with the lived experience of constitutionalism.
David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1459, 1468 (2001).
57. See, e.g., Lutz, supra note 35, at 237; Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 35, at 3.
58. Article V of the U.S. Constitution may well be the archetype in this respect:
it requires supermajority support in both chambers of Congress and among state
legislatures. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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the prevailing regime may have strong incentives to resist
constitutional amendment,59 and the difficulty of the
procedures furnished by the constitution may make it
relatively easy for defenders of the status quo to block
reform. Indeed, it is frequently suggested that the difficulty
of formal amendment under some constitutional regimes
has generated demand for other, less arduous and less
formal avenues of constitutional change.60
One common route to "informal" constitutional change
is judicial reinterpretation of existing constitutional
provisions.61  In these circumstances, the text remains
unchanged, but its meaning is authoritatively declared to
differ from previously settled understandings. In the United
States, for example, judicial reinterpretation of the scope of
national regulatory power during the New Deal period
dramatically altered the Constitution, expanding the power
of the central government and shifting authority from the
legislative to the executive branch,62 despite the lack of any
formal amendment to that effect. In Canada, a series of
decisions by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a
British court that served as the highest judicial authority
during Canada's colonial period, transformed a constitution
intended to establish a highly centralized state into one that
today makes Canada perhaps the most decentralized of all
federal states.63  More recently, decisions of the German
59. Alain C. Cairns, The Politics of Constitutional Renewal in Canada, in
REDESIGNING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 54, at 95,
96; Arthur Benz, Unsuccessful Reform and Successful Non-Reform-Constitutional
Policy in Germany and Canada 2 (Nov. 2008), https://verfassungswandel.files.word
press.com/2009/02/paper-osnabruck-arthur-benz.pdf; Levinson, supra note 34, at
691.
60. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., supra note 46, at 74; Griffin, supra note 56, at 2166;
Albert, supra note 16, at 1051.
61. Perhaps the best-known account of judicial reinterpretation as a source of
constitutional change is BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); see
also Albert, supra note 13, at 681-682; Denning, supra note 14, at 198, 201-02; Fusaro
& Oliver, supra note 49, at 415; WHEARE, supra note 14, at 215-23.
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937)
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548 (1937) (upholding provisions of the Social Security Act); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
63. PETER W. HOGG, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 123-27 (5th ed. 2007);
Gerald Baier, Canada: Federal and Sub-national Constitutional Practices, in
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Constitutional Court expanded the power of Lander
governments after a laboriously negotiated formal
amendment did not produce the desired reallocation of
authority.64
On the other hand, it is misleading to speak of courts as
though they are exogenous drivers of constitutional change.
Courts generally have few independent reasons to initiate
constitutional reform.65 Rather, judicial reinterpretation of
constitutional provisions eems more often to follow, and in
one way or another to respond to, changes in the governance
environment instigated by other actors of constitutional
rank. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, did not simply
decide on its own initiative that the power of the national
government to regulate economic activity needed expanding.
It reached that conclusion only after being presented with a
powerful and persistent demonstration that Congress and
the President-and by implication, the public-judged
broader national power to be essential to meet new
challenges.66 In many circumstances, then, courts are better
conceived not as initiators and drivers of constitutional
change, but as facilitators and ratifiers of constitutional
change sought by other constitutional actors.
CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: SUB-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 174, 174
(Michael Burgess & G. Alan Tarr eds., 2012).
64. Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of Constitutional Change
Between Reform and Evolution, 39 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM 213, 224-25 (2009); Arthur
Benz, German Dogmatism and Canadian Pragmatism? Stability and Constitutional
Change in Federal Systems 24-26 (Institut ffir Politikwissenschaft, FernUniversitat in
Hagen, Paper No. 65, 2008), https://www.fernuni-hagen.de/polis/download/polisn
r._65-2008_benz.pdf.
65. The one noteworthy exception is that a court may have an incentive to do so
on its own account, that is, as a player in a separation-of-powers contest. Thus, one
might see the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803),
in which it asserted for itself the power of judicial review, as an example of court-
instituted constitutional reform that did not respond to external political or social
forces, though of course, a contrary account is also possible.
66. In Bruce Ackerman's well-known account, the decision to expand national
power was in fact made by the people themselves acting informally as the pouvoir
constituant, and all branches of the federal government merely responded similarly to
identical stimuli. ACKERMAN, supra note 61, at 266-90.
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B. Changes in Practice as Drivers of Constitutional
Change
If this is correct, then several conclusions follow. First,
the most common and significant source of informal
constitutional change is not the judiciary, but other political
actors, typically those in the executive and legislative
branches.67 As Stephen Griffin has bluntly argued, "The most
significant source of constitutional change in the twentieth
century has ... been... changes initiated and carried out by
the President and Congress."68 Similarly, the editors of a
massive comparative study of constitutional change in
fourteen nations and the European Union likewise conclude
that legislatures, governments, and government leaders, in
addition to courts, are among the most significant drivers of
constitutional change.69
Second, the most common way in which executive and
legislative actors precipitate constitutional change may be
simply by changing their practices-how they go about their
official business. Through their own actions, in Keith
Whittington's words, "political actors ... alter their social
and institutional environment."70 On this view, legislatures
can precipitate informal constitutional change by altering
their internal procedures,71 or by enacting statutes that rely
on new constructions of legislative authority.72 Similarly,
executive branch officials may initiate constitutional change
by altering the way in which they conduct their offices.
Contemporary presidential practices of assembling and
relying on an official or a "kitchen" cabinet;73 assuming
unofficial leadership of political parties while in office; 74
67. Albert, supra note 13, at 642-43; Behnke & Benz, supra note 64, at 217;
Fusaro & Oliver, supra note 49, at 415; Griffin, supra note 56, at 2134; STEFAN VOIGT,
EXPLAINING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A POSITIVE ECONOMICS APPROACH 146 (1999);
Young, supra note 1, at 454.
68. Griffin, supra note 56, at 2134.
69. Fusaro & Oliver, supra note 49, at 414-15.
70. WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 18.
71. Fusaro & Oliver, supra note 49, at 415.
72. Albert, supra note 13, at 642-43; Behnke & Benz, supra note 64, at 217;
Young, supra note 1, at 454.
73. FRED 1. GREENSTEIN, INVENTING THE JOB OF PRESIDENT: LEADERSHIP STYLE FROM
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO ANDREW JACKSON 89 (2009).
74. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 13-14.
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exercising the veto power to block legislation on policy
grounds rather than merely on grounds of
unconstitutionality;75 and bypassing the Senate when
negotiating international agreements,76 to name just a few,
are all innovations in the reach of executive authority that
are "the product of one branch... claiming power for
itself."7 7 At the end of the day, Stefan Voigt has argued,
fostering informal constitutional change is within the power
of "every government representative in any government
branch who has any discretion in interpreting the
constitution."7 8
Perhaps no one has made this point as strongly as Karl
Llewellyn. In Llewellyn's view, it is not the constitution that
legitimates government practice, but the reverse: practice
legitimates the text-words in the constitution have force
only insofar as they comport with the practices government
actors actually find useful and employ in the everyday
business of good governance, as they understand it.7 9 As a
result, Llewellyn contends, government officials not only are
"the prime movers in preserving so much of the Constitution
as is preserved," but also "arrange all amending of that
Constitution."o "[T]he working Constitution," he goes on, "is
amended whenever the basic ways of government are
changed."81
Third, and perhaps most surprisingly, changes to the
constitution may on this view be initiated-and ushered a
great distance of the way toward permanence-through
what amounts to unilateral action by constitutional actors.
We normally think of constitutional amendments as
implementing laboriously negotiated principles and
compromises among the widest possible array of social
75. GREENSTEIN, supra note 73, at 85, 99.
76. STRAUSS, supra note 56, at 121; Albert, supra note 16, at 1065.
77. Denning, supra note 14, at 211.
78. VOIGT, supra note 67.
79. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 12.
80. Id.at21.
81. Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted). Griffin has pointed out, correctly, that this
overstates the power of practice to alter written constitutions: "In Llewellyn's theory,
the working or unwritten constitution virtually swallowed the 'big C' Constitution
whole. The unwritten constitution replaced the written and the Constitution became
a set of practices without a clear relationship to supreme law." Griffin, supra note 12,
at 367 (footnote omitted).
350
PRACTICE-DRIVEN CHANGES
stakeholders.82  In fact, informal constitutional change
arising from alterations in official practice can occur when
government officials simply begin to act in new ways that
they happen to find desirable, and to do so without prior
consultation or negotiation with other constitutional
stakeholders. As Behnke and Benz argue, "Constitutional
evolution is often initiated by unilateral action, by
parliaments making laws in areas of contested
responsibilities, by governments using their budgets to shift
the allocation of resources or to intervene in competences of
other governments."83 In Denning's formulation, these kinds
of actions may properly be understood as "claims of power"
that constitute "'moves' made by the 'legislative and
executive branches ... that serve as precedents for future
actions."'84  Changes in the constitutional allocation of
power, in this process, are thus effected not through
consultation and negotiation, albeit outside formal
amendment processes, but by a process of unilateral seizure
of new authority, followed by lack of resistance or by general
acquiescence.
This process is not unfamiliar, but it is usually
associated with the seemingly very different practice by
which unwritten constitutions undergo change. In the
British system, the constitution is comprised in part of
"conventions"-"practices that supplement the constituti-
onal text."8s Because the content of the constitution is
derived partly from practice, and practice may change,
changes in practice can indirectly amend the constitution.
Thus, constitutional amendment by convention can occur in
this kind of regime when "a political practice is adopted and
repeated, and gradually hardens over time."8 6  Yet, as
scholars such as David Strauss and Ernest Young have
argued, a similar process can be observed within the U.S.
constitutional regime either because constitutional meaning
82. Again, this is a concept of constitutions rooted in the contractarian model.
LOCKE, supra note 45; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 55-56 (1971).
83. Behnke & Benz, supra note 64, at 217; VOIGT, supra note 67, at 146.
84. Denning, supra note 14, at 211 (quoting JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-
1995, at 92 (1996)).
85. Whittington, supra note 2, at 1850.
86. Albert, supra note 16, at 1069.
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evolves in a continuous, incremental common law fashion,87
or because what counts as "constitutional" in our system
includes not just the constitutional text, but also "other legal
materials" "outside the Constitution itself."8 8
Finally, if political actors are capable of precipitating
informal constitutional amendment by changing their
practices, they might do so in at least two different
circumstances. One possibility is that official practice might
undergo a process of evolution in which practices slowly
change without any particular conscious direction.89 This
might occur when, for example, government officials
respond to "changes to the environment within which the
political system operates (including economics, technology,
and demographics),"9 0 or to large-scale shifts in social and
political practices.9 1  In these circumstances, Stephen
Skowronek has observed, government officials attempt to
adapt existing institutions and capacities to "an ever-
changing environment."92 Their goal, presumably, is not so
much to alter the system as to keep it running and capable of
achieving its original design goals in light of unforeseen
changes in the operating environment. This process is in a
sense the paradigm of common law evolution of
constitutional meaning.
There is, however, a second possibility: political actors
could alter their practices self-consciously9 3 with the
intention of deliberately changing the constitutional regime.
Such actors might choose this route for entirely benign
reasons; perhaps the existing constitutional regime provides
tools to achieve its goals that are no longer adequate to the
task, and officials wish self-consciously to introduce
innovations or workarounds in the service of collective
public goals that for some reason cannot feasibly be
implemented through formal constitutional amendment. On
87. STRAUSS, supra note 56, at 3.
88. Young, supra note 1, at 420, 456.
89. Pettit, supra note 7, at 24-25.
90. Lutz, supra note 35, at 242.
91. Levinson, supra note 34, at 699.
92. SKOWRONEK, supra note 11, at 10.
93. See Goodin, supra note 24, at 25 (observing that institutional change can




the other hand, political actors might also alter their
practices opportunistically to achieve personal goals, or
institutional ones that redound to their personal benefit. As
Keith Whittington has argued, innovations of this nature
(constitutional "constructions" in his terminology) "are
made by explicit advocates, not by disinterested arbiters.
Those who advocate a given construction expect to benefit
from it.... Self-interest is an intrinsic part of the
arguments."94
IV. PRACTICE-DRIVEN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
THE AMERICAN STATES
Thus far, I have confined myself to illustrations and
examples of constitutional change drawn from federal
constitutional law because of their familiarity. Yet
consideration of informal constitutional change on the
federal level focuses on but a small and comparatively
modest sample of often slow, incremental, and intermittent
change. Broadening our view to include the subnational
level reveals a very different picture: in the realm of
American constitutional law, informal constitutional change
of the practice-driven variety is commonplace, sometimes
rapid, and in many cases dramatic in its scale and
consequences.
Although examples could have been drawn from many
states, I will focus here on New York, where practice-driven
change to constitutional structures of governance has
occurred on an astonishing scale. As we will see, practice-
driven changes in New York have almost completely
transformed the legislative process, substituting for a
conventional scheme of open and accountable democratic
representation one that is opaque, oligarchic, and almost
entirely unaccountable. Practice-driven constitutional
changes have also led to a remarkable transformation of the
system of judicial selection contemplated by the New York
constitution, at both the trial and appellate levels. This Part
concludes with the story of how the governor of New York
appropriated for himself the power to appoint his own
successor, illustrating how a single, bold, unilateral change
94. WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 210.
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in executive practice quickly produced judicial ratification of
the move, leading in turn to a rapid, dramatic alteration in
received constitutional understandings.
A. Transformation of the Legislative Order: "Three Men in
a Room" and the Expedient Message of Necessity
The current New York constitution was adopted in
1938.9s Although it contains a few features that are
distinctive among American state constitutions,96 it is in its
broad outlines a document that adheres to the conventional
structural arrangements of American constitutional self-
governance.97 For example, it creates three branches of
government, including a bicameral legislature whose
members are elected from districts established throughout
the state.98  It also creates an independently elected
governor, who exercises executive power, which, typical
among the states, is shared with an independently elected
attorney general and comptroller.99
The legislative process it establishes is thoroughly
conventional and adheres to the standard American
blueprint. Laws are to be made by the legislature. Proposed
bills must be printed and placed "upon the desks of the
members" for three days before enactment.100 Legislative
committees may be formed to study problems, craft
responsive legislation, work out its details, and submit it for
broader deliberative consideration within each chamber.'0'
Either chamber may initiate legislation, and each may amend
95. N.Y. CONST.
96. See, for example, the pioneering "forever wild" provision creating the
Adirondack Preserve. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
97. By the late nineteenth century, American state constitutions largely
converged on a common model for structuring the institutions of governance. James
A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural
Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 31 (2014).
98. N.Y. CONST. arts. III-IV, VI.
99. N.Y. CONST. arts. IV-V. On the typicality of this arrangement, see G. ALAN
TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTION 121-122 (1998) and ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,
THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 303 (2009).
100. N.Y. CONST. art III, § 14.
101. The New York constitution does not require committees, but mentions in
the document show clearly that their existence is contemplated. See N.Y. CONST. art.
VII, §§ 1, 3.
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legislation proposed by the other.102 Bills passed by the
legislature are presented to the governor for signature or
return, and in the latter case the legislature may repass the
legislation by a two-thirds vote.103 In short, the New York
constitution contemplates a law-making procedure that
shares the attributes conventionally associated with
democratically representative government-namely, a
process that is open, inclusive, and deliberative. In this
procedure, the institution of legislative representation is
designed to provide all the people of the state a voice and
some agency in the formulation of state policies.
Actual practice, however, has deviated far from this
model. Some time in the twentieth century, the power to
study problems and formulate and enact legislation was
transferred by changes in practice from the legislature as a
body to three officials: the speaker of the Assembly, the
majority leader of the Senate, and the governor. The degree
of concentration of power is well described in a memoir
written by a former legislator:
[A]lthough there are 212 legislators in Albany, just
three men hold virtually all the cards; the Governor, the
Speaker, and the Majority Leader, known as the Big
Three. They determine the details of the budget....
They hire most of the staff, including those who draft
most bills. The leaders also dispense committee chairs
and membership assignments, assign office and office
furniture, and run all the services that legislators rely
on.... Should a member of one of the two houses
author a piece of legislation, the leader decides which
committee it goes to, whether it is passed in the
committee, and when or even if it gets passed out for a
(predetermined) vote on the floor. 104
The phrase "three men in a room" is widely used in New
York media coverage of the state capitol to describe the
process by which all significant legislation, including the
102. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 12.
103. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
104. SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN & ROBERT POLNER, THREE MEN IN A RooM: THE INSIDE
STORY OF POWER AND BETRAYAL IN AN AMERICAN STATEHOUSE 24 (2006).
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state budget, is shaped and enacted by these three
individuals.105
One might think that rank and file legislators have the
inherent power to participate in the lawmaking process by
simply behaving in the way that the state constitution
contemplates they should behave-that is, by insisting on
playing the participatory role that the constitution imagines,
and by flexing their muscle to defend their role. This does
not happen, however, apparently because generations of
legislators have acquiesced in the reconstruction of the
system: "When a leader sends a bill to the floor, legislators
understand it is their job to pass it as is, without amendment
or comment, and not a single bill goes down to defeat on the
floor unless guided by the leader's unmistakable hand."106
The absolute control of the Big Three leaders has been
strengthened by a longstanding and deeply entrenched
practice severely distorting the constitutional tool of
"messages of necessity." The New York constitution
provides:
No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it
shall have been printed and upon the desks of the
members, in its final form, at least three calendar
legislative days prior to its final passage, unless the
governor, or the acting governor, shall have certified,
under his or her hand and the seal of the state, the facts
which in his or her opinion necessitate an immediate
vote thereon, in which case it must nevertheless be
upon the desks of the members in final form, not
necessarily printed, before its final passage.107
The requirement that the text of bills be provided to
legislators at least three days before a vote, like similar
provisions added to many state constitutions adopted
primarily during the nineteenth century,108 "was aimed at
preventing hasty, ill-considered, and one-sided
105. See, e.g., Matthew Hamilton, 'Three Men' Deaf to Calls for Change, TIMES
UNION (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:50 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/
Three-men-deaf-to-calls-for-change-6120266.php [https://perma.cc/9V23-C5GS].
106. LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 104, at 45.
107. N.Y. CONST. art IlI, § 14.
108. TARR, supra note 99, at 117-21; WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 257-67.
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legislation."'09  The requirement of advance availability
promotes legislative contemplation, deliberation, and
participation, and is clearly intended to improve the quality
of state legislation. At the same time, the inclusion of a
bypass provision allowing faster consideration of urgent
bills "enables the state government to respond quickly when
extraordinary circumstances" make the usual period of delay
unwise.110
In practice, however, the necessity exception has
severely eroded the rule. By the early years of this century,
upwards of ten percent of all legislation was enacted subject
to a message of necessity."' The majority of these messages
of necessity were issued in the waning days of the legislative
session,112 a time of year when the New York Legislature
enacts much of its most important legislative agenda. Some
of the most controversial legislation, which could most
benefit from deliberative study and reflection, is rammed
through during the closing hours of the session. The
following account gives a sense of how this process unfolds:
On July 11, 1996, in the last days of the session, the
Legislature printed a 541-page, $18 billion bill covering
Medicaid, mental health, and prisons-and passed it the
very next day. It printed a 463-page, $12 billion bill
covering education and labor matters, and passed it on
the same day. It printed Governor Pataki's 53-page,
$1.75 billion Environmental Bond Act on July 12, and
passed it on the thirteenth.113
More recently, in 2013, the NY SAFE Act-a significant
piece of gun control legislation supported by the governor-
was printed and laid on senators' desks at eleven at night,
accompanied by a message of necessity from the
governor.114  Twenty minutes later, the state senate
approved the legislation.115 The next day, the state assembly
109. Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, "It Ain't Necessarily So": The Governor's
"Message of Necessity" and the Legislative Process in New York, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2219,
2221 (2013).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2234 tbl..
112. Id. at 2222.
113. LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 104, at 45-46.
114. Galie & Bopst, supra note 109, at 2262.
115. Id. at 2263.
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followed suit, though it did manage to reflect on and discuss
the bill for a few hours before passing it.1 1 6
The effect of this practice is to further consolidate
control of the state's legislative apparatus in the hands of the
three leaders. By denying rank and file legislators access to
the legislation they are asked to approve, the leaders make
dissent difficult and disruptive to the orderly management of
the chambers. Deals struck behind closed doors by the
leaders are thus given the best possible chance to sail
through the legislature without being questioned and
without significant opposition from an uninformed and
compliant body.
One might think that this practice might be thwarted by
judicial review of the grounds offered by the governor to
support his claims of necessity, but this has not happened.
In 2005, the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, put
this possibility to rest by holding that "the sufficiency of the
facts stated by the [g]overnor in a certificate of necessity is
not subject to judicial review."117 The withdrawal of the
courts, then, makes this an instance where a change of
constitutional practice initiated by government officials has,
for all intents and purposes, altered the constitutional plan
of governance.118
B. Alteration of the Constitutional Scheme of Judicial
Selection
Until the mid-nineteenth century, judges in New York
were selected by gubernatorial appointment. The
constitution of 1846 ended this system in favor of popular
elections for all judicial offices.119 This change in practice
occurred as part of a Jacksonian wave of reform that swept
116. Id. at 2262-63.
117. Maybee v. State, 828 N.E.2d 975, 977 (N.Y. 2005).
118. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure:
Legislative Compliance and judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITr. L. REv. 797, 800 (1987)
("[L]egislators often do not follow the legislative procedure requirements of the state
constitution, particularly where the legislative proposal is controversial and the
courts do not enforce the constitutional restriction....").
119. PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 128-
29 (1991) [hereinafter GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION]; PETER J. GALIE,




the nation,120 a movement embracing "a strident
egalitarianism"121 that professed "an appreciation of the
common man"122 and his capacity for intelligent and
virtuous democratic self-rule.123 In New York, however, the
switch to an elective judiciary responded just as much to a
belief that the state's governors were dispensing judgeships
as political patronage,124 resulting in the appointment of
judges who were either unduly beholden to the governor, or
corrupt in that they had obtained their positions by
performing service to the governor or his party to get their
jobs.
Accordingly, the New York constitution provides that
justices of the general state trial court, known as the New
York Supreme Court, shall be elected.125  Under the
constitutional plan, supreme court justices are elected as any
other officials are elected-they are "chosen by the electors
of the judicial district in which they are to serve."12 6 The
explicit reference to "choice" by "electors" affirms the
obvious: judicial elections are meant to be competitive
affairs in which the electorate is presented with a choice of
candidates and then selects its judges by voting. The
obvious purpose of such a system is the same as for any
election: to permit the people to select from among the
candidates the ones they deem, by whatever standards they
choose to apply, to be best qualified.
Changes in practice, however, have made the system of
judicial elections into something quite different. Elections in
New York are partisan, and in New York, as in other states,
an elaborate statewide party apparatus identifies, recruits,
develops, and ultimately nominates and supports party
candidates for elective office. For most offices, New York's
electoral system runs as might be expected: each party
nominates a candidate for each office, and those candidates
120. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 714-25 (1995).
121. HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 5
(1st ed. 1990).
122. GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA: 1828-1848, at xi (1959).
123. ROBERT V. REMINI, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 26 (1989).
124. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY, supra note 119.
125. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6(c).
126. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6(c).
2016] 359
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:335
then compete for the office by campaigning, typically with
the support of their party. In judicial elections, in contrast, a
different system prevails. Instead of mounting competitive
elections by choosing their own candidates and running
them against one another, party leaders cut cross-
endorsement deals across district lines.127 As a result, many
judicial candidates, perhaps most, run uncontested in their
own districts, endorsed by both major parties (and often by
some of the minor parties as well). As the editorial board of
one metropolitan newspaper ecently described the process:
[I]n New York,... voters have virtually no
influence over the selection of judges. Leaders of the
local Democratic and Republican parties decide
between them who they want on the bench, often
demand cash from the hopefuls, then crassly and openly
agree to endorse the other party's candidates.... Yes,
voters ultimately cast their ballots for judges, but the
political manipulation of the system renders their
efforts as little more than formality. The decision has
been made for them.128
Thus, in New York, the system contemplated by the
state constitution has been dramatically altered by changes
in the practices of elite officials; a system of competitive
democratic elections has been replaced by one in which the
selection is performed by party officials who remain
effectively insulated from democratic accountability.
For its highest court, the Court of Appeals, New York
employs a different system-one of merit selection-yet this
system, too, has wandered far from its original premises
following changes in official practice. For many years Court
of Appeals judges, like other state judges, were elected. By
1977, however, dissatisfaction with the "unseemly spectacle
of expensive, bitterly contested, partisan elections for seats
127. Opinion, Party Leaders Are Once More Conniving to Deprive Voters of a
Choice for Judge, BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 1, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.buffalon
ews.com/opinion/buffalo-news-editorials/party-leaders-are-once-more-conniving-
to-deprive-voters-of-a-choice-for-judge-20150901 [https://perma.cc/R4PX-WE DV].
128. Id.; see also Joseph Popiolkowski & Robert J. McCarthy, Sedita, Colaiacovo





on the highest court in the state"129 led to amendment of the
New York constitution to implement a new system for
selecting judges of the Court of Appeals, one based on merit.
This amendment provided the current system, in which
judges are appointed to the Court of Appeals by the
governor, but the governor is restricted in his possible
appointments to candidates forwarded by a newly created
governmental agency, the Commission on Judicial
Nomination. As in systems of lower-level civil service
employment, the Commission's role is to serve as an
impartial filter to identify from among New York's
thousands of lawyers, public officials, and public figures the
very best candidates. By this method, the New York
constitution attempts to avoid burdening nominees with the
obligation to campaign for office, while simultaneously
blocking the patronage abuses of the early nineteenth
century and ensuring that the governor appoints only judges
of the highest ability and integrity.130
It seems clear, in this system, that the function of the
Judicial Nominating Commission is to scour the state for the
best possible talent in order to ensure that New York's
highest court is populated exclusively by the most capable
lawyers in a state with an enormous depth of legal talent.
Yet the actual nominating practices of the Commission and
appointment practices of a series of governors have, at least
until very recently, converted the system into something
rather different. Between 1979 and 2010, the Commission
forwarded 160 nominations for twenty-four vacancies.131 Of
the nominees, 112 (70%) were former or sitting New York
judges.132 On twenty-one of these twenty-four occasions
(87.5%), governors appointed a sitting judge to the state's
highest court.133 Thus, although the current method of
selecting Court of Appeals judges was designed to be wide
129. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 119, at 339.
130. James A. Gardner, New York's Inbred Judiciary: Pathologies of Nomination
and Appointment of Court ofAppealsJudges, 58 BUFFALO L. REV. DOCKET 15, 20 (2010).
131. STATE OF N.Y. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL NOMINATION, CANDIDATES NOMINATED FOR
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open and based on merit, the selection process as it has
actually evolved in practice is neither. It has instead
degenerated into a fundamentally closed competition among
a very small number of sitting, experienced lower court
judges. It has become, in other words, a process not of
judicial appointment, but of judicial promotion.
In the last few years, it must be said, the Nominating
Commission appears to have widened its net, and the
present governor has shown himself willing to broaden the
court's membership to include individuals with a wider
variety of backgrounds. In 2013, the Commission nominated
and the governor appointed a law professor without
significant prior judicial experience.134 And in 2015, the
Judicial Nominating Commission reported out a list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the chief judgeship that,
remarkably, did not include a single sitting state judge.135
Thus, practice seems to be changing again, this time to bring
the process more into line with what appears to have been
its founding intentions. . This shows not that practice
changes moving a constitution away from its starting point
are subject to some kind of inherent gravitational pull
bringing them back to their roots; rather, it shows only that
constitutional change effectuated by alterations in official
practice may be both continual and lacking in long-term
stability.
C. Changes in Practice Eliciting Judicial Ratification:
Appointment of the Lieutenant Governor
In 2008, New York Governor Eliot Spitzer resigned from
office.136  Pursuant to the New York constitution, the
Lieutenant Governor, David Paterson, assumed the
134. Although Judge Jenny Rivera was not appointed directly from the state's
lower courts, she did serve for one year as an administrative law judge for the New
York State Division of Human Rights. Honorable jenny Rivera, ST. N.Y. CT. APPEALS,
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/jrivera.htm [https://perma.cc/QT5S-HTTM] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
135. The Commission on judicial Nomination Releases List of Seven Nominees In
Connection With Upcoming Vacany, ST. N.Y. COMMISSION JUD. NOMINATION (Oct. 15,
2005), http://nysegov.com/cjn/assets/documents/PR010116.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7UVV-UVK2].
136. Skelos v. Paterson, 915 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (N.Y. 2009).
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governorship, leaving the lieutenant governorship vacant.37
In those circumstances, the constitution provides:
In case of vacancy in the office of lieutenant-
governor alone, or if the lieutenant-governor shall be
impeached, absent from the state or otherwise unable to
discharge the duties of office, the temporary president
of the senate shall perform all the duties of lieutenant-
governor during such vacancy or inability. 38
Because the state senate was at the time deadlocked 31-
31, it had been unable for some time to name a president pro
tempore.139  Indeed, the senate had been paralyzed for
fifteen months and unable to pass any of the governor's
legislative agenda.140  Governor Paterson, eventually
growing impatient with the deadlock and seeking an ally to
cast tie-breaking votes in the senate, in 2009 announced he
was appointing Richard Ravitch, a private citizen with a long
history of valuable government service, to the office of
lieutenant governor.141 The governor sought neither
electoral ratification nor senatorial confirmation of this
appointment.142 This marked the first time in New York
history, under a succession of constitutions dating back to
1777, that a governor ever claimed this power.143  Ten
previous vacancies in the lieutenant governorship had been
filled by various means, but never by gubernatorial
appointment.144
The reasons for this tradition seem obvious. Those who
hold significant power in representative democracies are
generally thought to require at least some form of
democratic pedigree, and the more power they exercise, and
the more independently, the stronger the required pedigree.
Most typically, holders of high office in the United States are
either directly elected or must be confirmed by vote of a
137. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
138. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
139. Skelos, 915 N.E.2d at 1142.
140. Id. at 1147.
141. Id. at 1142.
142. Id. at 1146.
143. Id. at 1152 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
144. Skelos, 915 N.E.2d at 1152.
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democratically elected legislature or legislative chamber.145
This is especially true in the American states, where high
executive officials other than the governor and lieutenant
governor generally are directly elected. Governor Paterson's
departure from this pattern was especially surprising in that
the lieutenant governor could eventually have gone on to
assume the governorship, meaning that the governor could
not only have chosen his own successor, but have chosen a
successor who had never been approved by either the
people or their elected legislators.
The governor's decision was challenged in court, but in
a surprising 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the
appointment, ruling that a state statute permitting the
governor unilaterally to fill vacancies in executive offices
applied to vacancies in the lieutenant governorship.14 6 In a
forceful dissent by Judge Eugene Pigott, three judges
thoroughly rejected these arguments, holding that
succession to the lieutenant governorship was regulated by
the constitution, not by statute, and complaining that
"neither the Governor nor this Court can amend the
Constitution."147 Yet that is probably the best explanation
for what actually happened. A government official, faced
with new and unusual circumstances that in his judgment
impaired his ability to do his job adequately, responded by
unilaterally deviating from longstanding practice. Other
officials resisted, and counter-moved by going to court, but
the court rejected the challenge. As a result, a change in
practice produced not just a change in the meaning of the
constitution as interpreted privately by one official and his
allies, but also a change in the document's public meaning.
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: ARE THERE LIMITS?
The magnitude of the changes discussed in the previous
part, and their stark incompatibility in some cases with any
reasonable account of the state constitutional plan, raise
145. The one great exception that proves the rule-the office of president-is
filled by indirect election by what was intended to be essentially a kind of constituent
assembly, itself having a pedigree deemed democratically sufficient by the states. U.S.
CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 2.
146. Skelos, 915 N.E.2d at 1142.
147. Id. at 1157 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
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important questions about whether practice-driven
constitutional change can be limited, and if so, by what
means and to what extent. In principle, the most obvious
potential constraint on practice-driven change is judicial
review. Most constitutional democracies today employ some
kind of constitutional court to police the boundaries of the
state's constitution.148 Yet reliance on courts to constrain
practice-driven changes to the constitution may well be
misplaced. Judges, after all, are also government officials
who owe their offices to the same constitutional regime as
executive and legislative officials, and who must pursue the
same set of constitutionally prescribed goals, under the
same circumstances, as their colleagues in other branches.
This means that courts are subject, and may well respond, to
the same trends and conditions that induce officials in other
branches to alter their practices. Constitutional innovation
by executive and legislative officials aimed at more
effectively pursuing universally acknowledged goals of the
constitutional regime may thus be the kind of innovation
that constitutional courts are least likely to impede.
Moreover, experience suggests that courts may be
susceptible to being worn down over time by their
counterparts in the executive and legislative branches.
When conditions change in ways that really do make certain
aspects of the extant constitutional regime obsolete or
maladaptive, executive and legislative officials may attempt
innovative alterations in long-settled constitutional practice.
Courts may initially resist such changes. But when these
officials do so repeatedly, and especially collaboratively,
over long periods of time, emphatically insisting over and
over that constitutional practice must change to meet
current exigencies, courts may well capitulate. The U.S.
Supreme Court, to take a prominent example, for a time
resisted efforts by Congress and the President during the
New Deal period to enact expansive new federal regulatory
and spending programs.149 But when Congress and the
148. Ran Hirschl, The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 2, at 157, 157.
149. See, e.g., R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935)
(invalidating provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating portions of the National
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president continued to pass similar legislation year after
year, making increasingly clear their belief in the urgency of
the situation facing the nation, the Court eventually
capitulated. The famous "Switch in Time" was not the result
merely of a change of heart among some of the Justices, nor
was it a purely defensive response to President Roosevelt's
aggressive threat to pack the Court. It was also to a great
extent an awakening to the fact that what other elected
officials had been saying for years was true, and that a
reconsideration of the scope of national power truly was
required if the nation was to survive the crisis presented by
the Great Depression.
Another possible source of constraint on the scope of
practice-driven constitutional change is a popular check.
Elected officials who alter constitutionally grounded
practices too far or too freely-or who tolerate excessive
alterations by their lower-level subordinates-could be held
accountable at the polls. 50  Yet this seems unlikely.
Subnational politics is of notoriously low salience in the
United States; voters are uninformed and indifferent, and
they turn out in low numbers for state and local elections.15
If voters largely hold themselves aloof from subnational
politics even when substantive policy is at stake, it may be
too much to ask that they regularly and carefully monitor
and police the official practices employed by state
government officials. Moreover, unlike perhaps the
nineteenth-century electorate,152 the twenty-first-century
electorate does not seem to care much about the niceties of
constitutional structure and procedure. For today's voters,
outcomes seem to be the important thing, and how officials
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(invalidating portions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 regulating
wages and hours of mine workers).
150. As Madison put it, "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 5.
151. See, e.g., Voter Turnout, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/voter-turn
out#voterturnout_101 [https://perma.cc/3FT2-7NYL] (last visited June 11, 2016).
152. One of the signature characteristics of nineteenth-century American state
constitutionalism is the repeated insertion into state constitutions of procedural




produce them seems to strike voters as of considerably less
interest, if any.153
This analysis brings us back to Llewellyn, who, it will be
recalled, claimed in the strongest possible terms that official
practice controls and legitimizes the constitution rather than
the other way around.15 4 On this view, the only limit to
practice-driven constitutional change would appear to be
social: officials cannot unilaterally claim a constitutional
warrant for behavior that exceeds the bounds of what
society is willing to tolerate-that transgresses, one might
say, the social constitution that undergirds the political one.
Perhaps any practice that stands no possible chance of
adoption by formal constitutional amendment also cannot
successfully be smuggled into the constitution by informal
means. But even if this proposition is correct, it would not
necessarily point to an especially constraining limit on the
scope of practice-driven constitutional change. What the
citizenry is willing to tolerate may change considerably over
time, and to the extent that officials seek to change their
practices so as to pursue widely shared public goals, public
opposition need not be expected.
If the standard mechanisms of constitutional policing do
not seem promising for constraining practice-driven
constitutional change, a final possibility is that limits might
be achieved through structural constitutional design. One
device that has long been claimed to stabilize constitutions
at their design points is contestation-the deliberate
introduction into the constitutional scheme of competition
among holders of official power. In this arrangement,
characteristic of separation of powers and federalism,
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition."155 The
result is said to be a system in which the constraints of
constitutional design are enforced not through a static
process of promulgation followed by an expectation of
compliance supplemented by third-party policing, but
through a dynamic process in which a permanent struggle
among government power centers produces a durable
153. Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 131,
137 (2004).
154. Llewellyn, supra note 11, at 12, 21-22.
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 5.
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stalemate at the desired equilibrium point.156 In these
contestatory systems, the scope of practice-driven
constitutional change caused by any one actor could in
theory be confined not by any inherent or socially imposed
limitation, but by competitive resistance from other
constitutional actors. Practice in such a system would
change, but a kind of stability might be achieved if change
were constantly driven back toward the constitutionally
contemplated design point. In these circumstances, practice
might still alter the constitution, and such change might be
frequent or even constant, but it would in principle orbit
permanently around a constant, constitutionally defined
center of gravity.
The challenges of successfully executing such a plan are
obvious merely as a matter of design, but they seem to be
exacerbated by the possibility that changes in constitutional
practice might erode the underpinnings of the system's own
design foundations-they might, that is, undermine the
incentives of officials to engage in the required contestation.
It has often been observed that the competition between
branches of the federal government contemplated by the
constitutional scheme of horizontal separation of powers
never really materialized.57  Instead, competition was
quickly supplanted by cooperation among the branches,
particularly as a result of the unforeseen coordinating effects
of party politics. 58
156. Thomas Schwartz, Publius and Public Choice, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 31, 35 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989);
Ordeshook, supra note 3, at 204-05; ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (2011).
157. LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE Xi
(4th ed. 1998). For a description of late twentieth century "norms of inter-branch
cooperation within the national government," see Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch
Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns," Presidential
Impeachments, and judicial "Coups", 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 505-13 (2003).
For additional discussion, see James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation
of Powers and the Idea of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on Undemocratic
Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 293 (2005) (discussing how democratic norms have
altered the operation and effectiveness of the U.S. Constitution's structural backup
systems).
158. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 268-70 (2000); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY
GOVERNMENT 12 (1942).
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These considerations suggest the conclusion-highly
provisional to be sure-that practice-driven constitutional
change is a significant force behind the evolution of
constitutional substance; that it can be dramatic in its scope;
and that mechanisms to confine it are difficult to design and
unlikely to be very successful, especially over the long term.
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